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I’M BRINGING NOTICE BACK: 
REGISTRATION ALONE IS NOT  
ENOUGH TO PROMPT ACCRUAL  
OF A COPYRIGHT CLAIM 
Abstract: On November 14, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held, in Wilson v. Dynatone Publishing Co., that copyright regis-
tration alone is not enough to trigger accrual of an ownership claim. In so doing, 
the Second Circuit concluded that mere registration does not put a rational and 
attentive copyright owner on notice of adverse claims. The Second Circuit de-
termined that holding otherwise would impose an onerous and impractical bur-
den on authors to investigate the Copyright Office registry continuously to insure 
against registered illegitimate claims of authorship. Furthermore, the Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that such a holding would run counter to the purpose of § 205 of 
the Copyright Act. Thus, the Second Circuit joined the Third, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuits in a split from the First Circuit, which interpreted § 205(c) to mean that 
registration is enough to put others on constructive notice of the author’s owner-
ship. As a result of the First Circuit’s ruling, an author would be time-barred 
from asserting competing claims more than three years after another registered 
for sole ownership. This Comment argues that the Second Circuit’s approach is 
correct because it furthers the legislative intent of the Copyright Act and distin-
guishes the unique facts of the First Circuit case. The Second Circuit’s approach 
also promotes the protections of the copyright registration system by encouraging 
authors to register their creative works, while not imposing unrealistic obliga-
tions upon copyright owners that actually could deter registration. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Copyright Act of 1976 aims to promote the production of original lit-
erary, artistic, and musical expression for public consumption.1 The 1976 revi-
sions introduced more progressive, lenient policies by removing the require-
ment of strict observance to copyright formalities of the Copyright Act of 
1909.2 Generally, copyright law safeguards original works of authorship by 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the 
power to establish copyright protections for the innovative works of authors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8. 
 2 Fred Koenigsberg, The 1976 Copyright Act: Advances for the Creator, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
515, 525 (1977). Today, the Copyright Act of 1976 is the primary legislation for U.S. copyright law. 
Daniel Porter, Then I Saw the Contract, Now I’m a Believer: Why “Concept Groups” Are “Works for 
Hire” and Cannot Invoke Statutory Termination Rights After 2013, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 507, 511 
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recognizing property rights in expressive information.3 Copyright protection is 
not conditional upon registration, but rather is established when an author fixes 
an original work in a “tangible medium of expression.”4 Registration, although 
not mandatory, nevertheless provides certain legal benefits to authors.5 An im-
portant advantage of registration is that recordation of a document with the 
                                                                                                                           
(2012). In 1976, Congress conducted its first substantial revision of the U.S. Copyright Act since 
1909. Koenigsberg, supra, at 515. These revisions directly responded to the 1909 Copyright Act’s 
rigid procedures regarding copyright registration, notice, and deposit. Id. at 525. For instance, under 
the 1909 Copyright Act, incorrect placement or accidental exclusion of notice regularly resulted in the 
withdrawal of copyright owners’ rights to their work. Id. Congress also enacted these significant revi-
sions in 1976 to address the major technological developments that occurred since 1909, such as the 
introduction of television and sound recordings. Porter, supra, at 511. Additionally, in anticipation of 
the United States’ participation in the upcoming Berne Convention, Congress amended the Copyright 
Act of 1909 to ensure that the United States was complying with international copyright principles. 
Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N RES. LIBRS., https://www.arl.
org/copyright-timeline/#Top [https://perma.cc/JDK9-27Y2]. Enacted in 1886, the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is an agreement that safeguards the rights of authors 
over their creative works. What Is the Berne Copyright Convention?, WHAT IS COPYRIGHT.ORG (Oct. 
23, 2017), https://whatiscopyright.org/what-is-the-berne-copyright-convention/ [https://perma.cc/
49M8-DR6B]. The agreement protects authors of member countries and aims to advance international 
uniform standards in copyright protections. Copyright Timeline, supra. The Berne Convention is re-
sponsible for several transformative revisions, including the establishment of the duration for copy-
rights, banning of copyright formalities as a condition of protection, and acknowledgement of authors’ 
moral rights. Id. 
 3 Marshall A. Leaffer, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 1–2 (6th ed. 2014). The term “original 
work of authorship” refers to a work that has been individually designed by its author, occurring in 
any form of expression. Original Work of Authorship Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://
definitions.uslegal.com/o/original-work-of-authorship/ [https://perma.cc/F8C2-ZTXR]. As society has 
become more technologically advanced, the need for increased protections over information industries 
and intangible products has grown rapidly. See Leaffer, supra, at 1–2 (describing how the United 
States’ transition from an industrial society to an information and communication-based society re-
sulted in intellectual property concerns taking on paramount significance). 
 4 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 408(a); see 9 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COP-
YRIGHT § 2 (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2019) (summarizing § 408(a) to state that registration is not 
required to enact copyright protection). Registration, moreover, is not even necessary to establish a 
copyright. See Leaffer, supra note 3, at 281 (describing registration as a liberal, noncompulsory pro-
cedure that can take place at any point within the copyright’s term); see also 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (stat-
ing that an author may register a claim for sole ownership of a copyright at any time during the copy-
right’s term). In fact, the practice of copyright registration is entirely exclusive to the American legal 
system. Leaffer, supra note 3, at 277. 
 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 202. The benefits of copyright registration briefly include 
the following: establishment of a public record of the copyright detailing important facts concerning 
the piece’s authorship, securing an author’s right to file a copyright infringement suit for works origi-
nating in the United States, establishment of prima facie evidence regarding the copyright’s authen-
ticity, and the expansion of remedies available to an author when filing a copyright infringement law-
suit, including statutory damages and legal fees. Id.; Leaffer, supra note 3, at 281–82. In totality, early 
registration of a copyrighted work becomes critical in enabling authors to enforce the legal and own-
ership rights to which they are entitled. Leaffer, supra note 3, at 287. In 2017, the U.S. Copyright 
Office reported that it filed 453,122 claims for registration and recorded approximately 14,644 docu-
ments that included titles of over 418,900 works. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FISCAL 2017 ANNUAL 
REPORT 2 (2017). 
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U.S. Copyright Office constitutes constructive notice to all persons that copy-
right is claimed in the work.6 
In 2018, in Wilson v. Dynatone Publishing Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit joined the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits in holding 
that it would be unduly cumbersome to authors, and would open the floodgates 
to groundless registrations, to find that copyright registration alone provides 
adequate notice to copyright owners of adverse claims.7 The First Circuit pre-
viously determined, contrary to its sister circuits, that § 205(c) of the Copy-
right Act of 1976 instructs that registration of a copyright is sufficient to estab-
lish a claim for sole authorship.8 As a result, the First Circuit held that the act 
of registration was enough to place others on constructive notice of any ad-
verse claims and to start the tolling of the statute of limitations.9 Therefore, by 
aligning with the majority of the circuits that have addressed this question, the 
Second Circuit’s ruling made the First Circuit an outlier.10 
                                                                                                                           
 6 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 202. In copyright law, registration is a process that is en-
tirely distinct from recordation. Id. § 202.3. Registration of a copyright claim entails submitting an 
application, delivering copies, and providing a filing fee, whereas recordation is the process by which 
documents pertaining to copyright claims, such as a promise to transfer title, are recorded. Id.; see 17 
U.S.C. § 205 (distinguishing the concepts of registration and recordation). Recordation, moreover, can 
occur even when the owner has not registered the copyright. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM 
OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 2303 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]. The term 
“constructive notice” refers to notice that a party is presumed by law to have attained, based upon the 
presence of certain facts and circumstances. Notice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 7 See 908 F.3d 843, 844 (2d Cir. 2018) (determining that the statutory language of the construc-
tive notice provision in § 205(c) does not mean that registration is sufficient to establish accrual of a 
copyright ownership claim); Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 71–72 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that 
registration alone is not enough to refute co-authorship because co-authors are not obligated to moni-
tor the registry of copyrights for competing claims); Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, 
LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 390 (6th Cir. 2007) (determining that ownership claims are time-barred when 
there is a clear and explicit rejection of a claim of ownership); Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 
654–55 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that it is not expected of authors to constantly check for adverse 
claims to their copyrights because it is neither the objective of registration, nor copyright notice, to 
trigger the running of the statute of limitations). 
 8 Compare Saenger Org., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 55, 66 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (holding that authors’ copyright ownership claims accrue upon registration with the U.S. 
Copyright Office), with Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 655 (distinguishing its holding from the First Circuit in 
Saenger upon reasoning that the purpose of registration is neither to trigger the tolling of the statute of 
limitations, nor to commence accrual of authors’ ownership claims). 
 9 See Saenger, 119 F.3d at 66–67 (ruling that § 205(c) dictates that registration of a copyright is 
adequate notice to others of ownership claims and, therefore, registration under § 205(c) tolls the 
statute of limitations); infra notes 22, 108–109 and accompanying text. Adverse claims generally arise 
in two scenarios: (1) when the U.S. Copyright Office obtains multiple registration applications for 
identical works that include inconsistent statements concerning ownership and/or authorship and are 
submitted by separate applicants; and (2) when a party applies for registration and contends that an-
other party’s claim to the copyrighted work is illegitimate or baseless. COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, 
§ 1808. 
 10 Compare Wilson, 908 F.3d at 845 (holding that a claim of exclusive ownership does not auto-
matically accrue upon registration of a copyright), Brownstein, 742 F.3d at 71–72 (determining that 
registration alone is not sufficient to repudiate, meaning revoke, a competing claim of sole author-
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Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the law of copyright registra-
tion, including the manifestation of notice under § 205(c), and outlines the 
facts and procedural history of Wilson.11 Part II analyzes the legal framework 
of copyright registration and discusses the existing circuit split, with the Third, 
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits taking a position contra to the First Circuit’s 1997 
ruling in Saenger Organization v. Nationwide Insurance Licensing Associates, 
Inc.12 Finally, Part III posits that the First Circuit’s holding in Saenger is 
properly limited to its facts, and concludes that the Second Circuit’s ruling in 
Wilson is a more practical application of § 205(c), given the legislative intent 
of § 205(c)’s constructive notice provision as well as the larger goals of the 
Copyright Act of 1976.13 
I. COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION, NOTICE, AND WILSON BASICS 
In Wilson, the Second Circuit held that mere registration of a copyright 
does not establish sufficient notice to copyright owners of competing claims, 
and thereby trigger the tolling of the statute of limitations.14 Section A of this 
Part discusses the fundamental concepts of copyrights and copyright registra-
tion.15 Section B explains the importance of notice, both actual and con-
structive, under § 205(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976.16 Section C ana-
lyzes the facts and procedural history of Wilson, from its origins in the 
Southern District of New York to its disposition in the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit.17 
                                                                                                                           
ship), Roger Miller Music, 477 F.3d at 390 (holding that mere registration does not constitute clear 
and adequate repudiation of an adverse claim of ownership), and Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 655 (ruling that 
the intention behind copyright registration and notice was not to prompt accrual of an ownership 
claim), with Saenger, 119 F.3d at 66–67 (holding that registration is sufficient to place others on no-
tice of a registrant’s claim of sole authorship and commence the running of the statute of limitations 
for adverse ownership claims). Possessing exclusive ownership in a copyrighted work equips a copy-
right holder with six critical rights: (1) the right to duplicate and create copies of the initial work; (2) 
the right to develop secondary works emanating from the initial work; (3) the right to disburse dupli-
cations to others by sale or other methods of transmission; (4) the right to openly showcase the work; 
(5) the right to openly display the work; and (6) the right to play sound recordings openly via auto-
mated audio transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Thus, exclusive ownership equips copyright holders with 
an important bundle of rights, whereas authors that do not possess ownership rights in their copyright-
ed works may only have a limited portion of these rights or none at all. Richard Stim, Who Owns and 
Holds the Rights to a Copyright: When Might a Copyright Be Owned by Someone Other Than the 
Creator?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/copyright-ownership-rights-29953.html 
[https://perma.cc/RM8E-EZY5]. 
 11 See infra notes 14–55 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 56–85 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 86–113 and accompanying text. 
 14 908 F.3d at 844. 
 15 See infra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 28–55 and accompanying text. 
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A. Copyright and Registration Basics 
Copyrights provide legal protection for authors’ ownership rights in their 
creative works that have been produced in a material form of expression.18 The 
U.S. Copyright Office encourages authors to register their works of authorship 
with the Register of Copyrights.19 Although not required, registration offers 
certain legal protections and benefits, such as allowing authors of works origi-
nating in the United States to bring actions for infringement, and registration 
also establishes prima facie evidence of legitimacy to their copyrights.20 To 
register a copyright, an owner must meet three requirements: (1) complete a 
formal application, (2) provide payment for each claim, and (3) produce copies 
                                                                                                                           
 18 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (affording authors copyright protection for the novel works they create that 
have been fixed in a physical form of expression and can then be copied, identified, or transmitted). A 
work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” when it is recorded or directed by the author in some 
permanent form, such that the work can be perceived, copied, or transmitted. Jonathan Bailey, What 
Does ‘Tangible’ Mean in Copyright, PLAGIARISM TODAY (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.plagiarismtoday.
com/2017/10/03/with-copyright-what-does-tangible-mean/ [https://perma.cc/E7Y9-RRWU]. 
 19 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 202. Registration is encouraged because it provides own-
ers with important legal advantages while also serving the interests of users and the general public. Id. 
Registration enables owners to claim priority of authorship and thus gain protection from unauthor-
ized third party uses. Leaffer, supra note 3, at 280. Additionally, works created in the United States 
must be registered with the U.S. Copyright Office before an author can file suit for copyright in-
fringement. 17 U.S.C. § 411. Authors can also obtain statutory remedies for works that have been 
registered prior to infringement or within three months of publication. Id. § 412. In addition to these 
advantages, registration also provides benefits to users by establishing a public record of important 
information regarding the ownership and authorship of the registered work. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
CIRCULAR 1: COPYRIGHT BASICS 5 (2017), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf [https://perma.
cc/V2PY-75JA]. As a result, both authors and users can easily track registered works of authorship. 
See Leaffer, supra note 3, at 280 (describing the manner in which the registration system fosters the 
transfer of copyright ownership, tracks assignments, and promotes licensing, all of which allow poten-
tial purchasers to detect the status of a piece and to acquire any pertinent information regarding market 
availability). The legitimacy and efficiency inherent in this process, moreover, makes prospective 
transferees more willing to participate in the registration system because it provides key evaluative 
information regarding available works. Id. Although registration confers numerous benefits upon both 
authors and users, the system has also been criticized for being inaccurate because information in the 
Copyright Office records can be imprecise and lacking. Id. This, in part, is because the Copyright 
Office generally does not make findings of fact and, instead, accepts as true all plausible facts stated 
in the registration documents. COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, §§ 309.2, 602.4(C). Furthermore, when 
works are not available within the Copyright Office records, this does not mean that they are without 
protections, as many authors refrain from registering their copyrights. Leaffer, supra note 3, at 280. 
Authors who choose not to register their works, however, still acquire basic copyright protections 
once their works are secured in a tangible medium of expression, such as the ability to copy, sell, and 
act out the copyrighted work. What Rights Do I Have if My Copyright Is Unregistered?, LEGAL-
MATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/unregistered-copyrights.html [https://perma.
cc/R448-TALA]; see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (outlining the exclusive rights that owners inherently possess 
with respect to their copyrighted works). 
 20 COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, § 202; see supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing the 
benefits of copyright registration, with an emphasis on the legal protections afforded to authors and 
the extensive accessibility to registered works of authorship enjoyed by the public). 
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of the material for which registration is being sought.21 Under the Copyright 
Act, the statute of limitations for all civil claims is three years and begins to 
toll upon claim accrual.22 
B. Notice and § 205(c) Basics 
Section 205, commonly referred to as the recording statute, outlines the 
U.S. Copyright Office’s process for approving documents for recordation.23 Re-
cordation is the process by which copyright-related documents are filed with the 
Copyright Office and then made available to the public for examination through 
publication of correct and precise copies.24 The general purpose of § 205 is to 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 409 (listing the three necessary conditions for copyright registration). 
 22 Id. § 507(b). The time at which a claim accrues is difficult to discern, especially within the 
context of competing claims for copyright ownership. Leaffer, supra note 3, at 541–42. In an attempt 
to resolve this issue, courts have taken diverging views. Compare Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 654–55 (hold-
ing that the claimant’s co-authorship claim was timely because registration was not enough to start the 
tolling of the statute of limitations), with Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 289 & n.5, 290 (6th Cir. 
2005) (holding that an ownership claim was time-barred after the claim had been repudiated more 
than three years prior to the filing of the lawsuit). 
 23 See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (describing the requirements for recordation, which include submission 
of documents relating to the copyright, along with authentic copies signed by the executing party, and 
payment of fee to the U.S. Copyright Office). 
 24 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 12: RECORDATION OF TRANSFERS AND OTHER DOCU-
MENTS 1 (2016), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ12.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED3V-HFPA]. The 
recordation process is comprised of: (1) obtaining documents related to copyrights for recordation 
from remitters; (2) inspecting documents to certify that they are suitable for recordation; (3) catalogu-
ing the information in the documents for the purpose of publishing them in the U.S. Copyright Of-
fice’s public directory of recorded materials; (4) providing copies of the documents that will then be 
made available for public review; and (5) returning to remitters those documents that have been labelled 
as recorded. Id. at 1–2. A remitter is an individual who transmits payments to another. Remitter, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6. The three most common types of documents eligible for recordation are 
copyright ownership transfers, termination notices, and miscellaneous documents relating to a copyright. 
Document Recordation, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/recordation/ [https://perma.cc/
3GYD-CGZP]; see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 201.4, 201.10 (2020) (describing the conditions for submitting 
registration transfers of copyright ownership, notices of termination of transfers and licenses, and 
other documents pertaining to a copyright). Ownership transfers allow for a holder in the copyright to 
convey all or partial ownership rights in the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). Termination notices permit 
copyright holders to discontinue agreements that conveyed or licensed the holder’s copyright to a third 
party. COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, § 2304.1(A). Congress passed two acts creating alternative meth-
ods of recordation in 1990. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 7.25. The Visual Artists Rights Act 
created a system in which any author of a work could record their identity and address with the Copy-
right Office. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 106A (providing that works of art that satisfy certain statutory re-
quirements afford their creators moral rights). Moral rights, as referenced in this act, encompass spe-
cific noneconomic rights that are viewed as personal to an author. Authors, Attribution, and Integrity: 
Examining Moral Rights in the United States, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/policy/
moralrights/ [https://perma.cc/J3MK-R33Q]. Additionally, the Computer Software Rental Amend-
ments Act established a similar recordation procedure that permitted the Register of Copyrights to 
record any document designated as relating to computer shareware. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 
4, § 7.25; see 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)–(d) (granting rental rights to copyright owners of computer pro-
grams, effectively prohibiting purchasers of said computer programs from renting or lending them for 
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establish priority between adverse claims of ownership when there are transfers 
of title.25 Section 205(c) further illustrates the larger importance of § 205 be-
cause it highlights two fundamental copyright issues—the establishment of con-
structive notice of ownership and the ability of a subsequent transferee to claim 
ownership of a copyrighted work over a prior transferee.26 Thus, given today’s 
global marketplace and the high degree to which transfers of intellectual proper-
ty occur, § 205 serves an important function in facilitating transfers of title.27 
C. Factual and Procedural History of Wilson 
In Wilson, the Second Circuit deliberated over competing claims of copy-
right ownership rights in the context of both a musical composition and a 
sound recording.28 Plaintiffs John Wilson, Charles Still, and Terrance Stubbs 
(collectively, the Band) were former members of the musical performance 
group “Sly Slick & Wicked.”29 While touring with the Band, plaintiff Wilson 
composed “Sho’ Nuff (You Really Love Him)” (Sho’ Nuff).30 In April 1973, 
                                                                                                                           
profit). The rental rights established through this act protect copyright holders, in that they prohibit 
owners of valid copies of computer programs from renting them out for commercial gain. U.S. COPY-
RIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 92: COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 22–24 (2016), https://www.
copyright.gov/title17/title17.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD9T-EM86]. 
 25 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2. The recordation statute’s constructive notice element 
becomes particularly significant when conflicts emerge between transfers of title in copyright. Leaffer, 
supra note 3, at 289. Under these circumstances, the transfer first executed receives priority, provided 
that the transfer has been timely recorded in the United States and recordation is properly completed 
so as to establish constructive notice. 17 U.S.C. § 205(d); Leaffer, supra note 3, at 289; see Gaiman, 
360 F.3d at 655 (concluding that the purpose of the constructive notice provision in § 205(c) is to 
demonstrate priority in the event that disputes arise). Thus, priority is critical in that it dictates who 
ultimately possesses rights in the copyrighted work following a transfer of interest. Leaffer, supra 
note 3, at 289. 
 26 See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (outlining the constructive notice provision of § 205). 
 27 Id.; see STUART MEYER, FENWICK & WEST LLP, THE TRANSFER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: CAN THERE BE TOO MUCH FREEDOM IN THE MARKETPLACE FOR IDEAS? 1 (2009), 
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Transfer_IP_Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3Q8-8KU5] 
(observing that the existence of intellectual property transfers has allowed for new industries to emerge, 
as rights in intellectual property are easily transmitted between parties, thereby developing an entirely 
new form of trade). 
 28 908 F.3d at 843. A musical work is distinct from a sound recording, in that the composition—
the song itself—is the musical work, whereas a sound recording refers to the song as performed by a 
specific artist. COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, § 802.8(A). Copyright registration for a musical work com-
prises of the lyrics and music within that composition, but does not include a precise recording of that 
composition. Id. 
 29 Wilson v. Dynatone Publ’g. Co., 892 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 2018). The Band, comprised of 
three Cleveland, Ohio natives, officially assembled in 1970 and sustained an enduring career through the 
production and composition of soul music. Greg McIntosh, Sly, Slick & Wicked Biography, ALLMUSIC, 
https://www.allmusic.com/artist/sly-slick-wicked-mn0001294386/biography [https://perma.cc/Y6YB-
CPA7]. The Band performed on and off as a soul trio throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, and 
eventually went on to receive significant accolades, such as an induction into the Motown Alumni 
Associate Hall of Fame. Id. 
 30 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 115. 
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the Band recorded “Sho’ Nuff” at Studio 88 in New York City.31 After the 
Band’s sound recording, Edward Perrell, a musical promoter, played the “Sho’ 
Nuff” recording for executives of People Records, a record label run by soul-
funk icon James Brown.32 Brown and Perrell subsequently altered the record-
ing by “sweetening” the track through the addition of strings and bells.33 The 
ensuing litigation before the Second Circuit, therefore, focused on establishing 
the individual ownership rights to both the Band’s sound recording and musi-
cal composition for its “Sho’ Nuff” single.34 
With respect to the sound recording, on June 28, 1973, People Records 
put out a commercial release of the “Sho’ Nuff” single that incorporated the 
sweetening modifications.35 In this release, People Records gave production 
credit to Brown and Perrell, and named Polydor, a British record label and 
company, as the owner of the copyright for the recording.36 Prior to the com-
mercial release, Polydor formally registered a copyright in the Copyright Of-
fice for the “Sho’ Nuff” sound recording, claiming both that the recording was 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Wilson v. Dynatone Publ’g. Co., 16 Civ. 104 (PAE), 2017 WL 1330336, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
10, 2017), aff’d in part and vacated in part, remanded by 892 F.3d 112 (2018). 
 32 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. The iconic James Brown, known as the Godfather of Soul, was an 
African-American musician who revolutionized the music industry with his soul, funk sound, spurring 
the development of numerous musical genres. James Brown, ROCK & ROLL HALL OF FAME, https://
www.rockhall.com/inductees/james-brown [https://perma.cc/6WRE-CB5L]. Brown had seventeen 
singles that made it to No. 1 on the Billboard R&B charts and in 1986 was inducted into the Rock and 
Roll Hall of Fame. Kristin Corpuz, James Brown’s Biggest Billboard Hot 100 Hits, BILLBOARD (May 
3, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/7775674/james-brown-songs-billboard-
hot-100-hits [https://perma.cc/C59Y-MYTE]. Rolling Stone later ranked Brown number seven on its 
list of the hundred greatest artists of all time. 100 Greatest Artists: The Beatles, Eminem and More of 
the Best of the Best, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 3, 2010), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-
lists/100-greatest-artists-147446/james-brown-2-30248/ [https://perma.cc/HM5P-JEBQ]. Additional-
ly, Brown is recognized as the most heavily sampled artist in history. Inductees: James Brown, ROCK 
& ROLL HALL OF FAME & MUSEUM (Dec. 2, 2006), https://web.archive.org/web/20061202170408/
http://www.rockhall.com/hof/inductee.asp?id=56 [https://perma.cc/AJ3Z-VP8U]; see infra note 44 
and accompanying text. Additionally, Brown is credited as a co-producer on the “Sho’ Nuff” record-
ing. Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. Music producers are responsible for managing the recording and crea-
tion of a single, sound track, or record. CRAS, https://cras.edu/music-production/ [https://cras.edu/
music-production/]. Generally, their tasks include sound checking recordings, offering recommenda-
tions for modifications, or cooperating with other professionals to create a successful record. Id. 
 33 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. Sweetening is a popular audio mixing function that adds extra audio 
to a soundtrack to enhance the overall sound and complexities of a musical composition. Audio 
Sweetening and Mixing, HENCAR, http://hencar.com/processes/post-production/audio-sweetening-and-
mixing/ [https://perma.cc/24KN-YKFB]. Audio sweetening can cover anything from adding music to 
a sound recording to manipulating an artist’s voice. Id. 
 34 Wilson, 908 F.3d at 843. 
 35 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. 
 36 Id. Polydor was the successor-in-interest to People Records, as well as the predecessor-in-interest 
to Universal Music Group, Inc. (UMG). Id. Polydor rose to prominence by amassing an impressive roster 
of British pop and rock talent, while simultaneously establishing roots in the American music scene 
through its acquisition of well-known soul and R&B acts, such as Aretha Franklin. About, POLYDOR, 
https://www.polydor.co.uk/about/ [https://perma.cc/CE5J-FWRY]. 
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a “work made for hire” and that Polydor had exclusive ownership as the em-
ployer.37 The Band disputed this claim, however, and asserted that it never 
agreed to “work made for hire” provisions or the transfer of renewal term cop-
yrights, with either People Records or Perrell.38 On December 21, 2001, the 
successor-in-interest to People Records, Universal Musical Group, Inc. 
(UMG), nevertheless proceeded to file a registration for a renewal term copy-
right of the “Sho’ Nuff” recording with the Copyright Office.39 
With regard to the composition, on May 12, 1973, the Band registered a 
copyright claim for “Sho’ Nuff,” naming the three band members as co-
authors.40 On July 9, 1973, Perrell registered the “Sho’ Nuff” composition with 
Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI), and credited Dynatone Music, Belinda Music, 
and Perrell Music as publishers.41 Subsequently, Chappell & Co., predecessor-
in-interest to defendant Unichappell, registered a copyright for the “Sho’ Nuff” 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. Although copyrighted works typically become the property of the 
creator, there are exceptions when a work is produced for the benefit of an employer. U.S. COPY-
RIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 09: WORKS MADE FOR HIRE 1 (2012), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/
circ09.pdf [https://perma.cc/J643-JMMJ]. These works of authorship are referred to as “works made 
for hire,” in that employees produce such works during the course of their employment. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101. Thus, “works made for hire” credit the employer with authorship, even if an employee was 
actually responsible for its creation. See id. (defining a “work made for hire”). 
 38 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. Prior to January 1, 1978, copyright owners could obtain protection for 
their works for an initial term of twenty-eight years, followed by one renewal term. U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, CIRCULAR 6A: RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT 1 (2017) [hereinafter CIRCULAR 6A], https://www.
copyright.gov/circs/circ06a.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UUH-AEE4]. Now, however, copyright owners 
receive one term of protection that typically carries on for an author’s life plus seventy years. Id. at 1 
n.1. 
 39 CIRCULAR 6A, supra note 38, at 1 n.1. UMG succeeded to the rights of Polydor Records, the 
company that in 1971 purchased People Records, which was founded by James Brown. Josh Russell, 
Royalties Claim Revived Over Timberlake Hit ‘Suit & Tie,’ COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (June 6, 
2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/royalties-claim-revived-over-timberlake-hit-suit-tie/ [https://
perma.cc/AT5M-T9Z6]. 
 40 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. Co-authors or collaborators appear in the context of works of joint 
authorship. Copyright Ownership: The Joint Authorship Doctrine, FINDLAW, https://corporate.find
law.com/intellectual-property/copyright-ownership-the-joint-authorship-doctrine.html [https://perma.
cc/A2RS-6HGP]. As co-authors, each author can designate the rights and responsibilities of the work 
among themselves. Id. 
 41 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 115. BMI is a membership organization that acts as a link between songwrit-
ers and the businesses that air their musical compositions for public benefit. BMI, https://www.bmi.com/
about [https://perma.cc/U5B4-HC7X]. BMI facilitates business transactions between songwriters and 
music publishers in the collection of royalties. Wilson, 892 F.3d at 115. Royalties—specifically re-
ferred to as performance right royalties in the context of musical performances—are payments given 
to songwriters after a live, public performance of one of their songs. Heather McDonald, How Per-
formance Rights Royalties Are Paid, BALANCE CAREERS (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.thebalance
careers.com/how-performance-rights-royalties-are-paid-2460913 [https://perma.cc/YHL4-F7F3]. 
Dynatone Music, Belinda Music, and Perrell Music are all current or former U.S.-based publishing 
entities. Belinda Music, Inc. vs. Belinda Music Inc., DISCOGS, https://www.discogs.com/forum/thread/
704075 [https://perma.cc/FVJ3-LNMB]; Dynatone Music Publishing, DISCOGS, https://www.discogs.
com/label/1395404-Dynatone-Music-Publishing [https://perma.cc/R23Z-T7BR]; Perrell Music, DIS-
COGS, https://www.discogs.com/label/568738-Perrell-Music [https://perma.cc/UM9U-HS49]. 
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composition, designating Dynatone Publishing Company as claimant to own-
ership rights, and identifying plaintiffs as the songwriters.42 When the Band 
filed a renewal registration, on November 19, 2015, it claimed ownership of 
the renewal term copyright for the composition.43 
In the four decades since People Records released the “Sho’ Nuff” record-
ing, the composition has achieved renewed commercial success through the 
use of sampling, a practice in which artists incorporate the recordings of others 
into their own musical works.44 In mid-January of 2013, Justin Timberlake, a 
multi-platinum recording artist, sampled the “Sho’ Nuff” recording, which in-
cluded the Band’s vocals, in the commercial release of his popular single, 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. Chappell & Co. Ltd. is a British publishing company that was founded 
in 1810. Chappell & Co. Ltd., DISCOGS, https://www.discogs.com/label/273333-Chappell-Co-Ltd 
[https://perma.cc/7BAD-XB8W]. The group later changed its name to Chappell International Music. 
Id. Since its incorporation, Chappell International Music has gained recognition as a music publishing 
company with a global market. Id. The company was subsequently sold to Warner Communications 
Inc., allowing Chappell to amass a robust catalogue of music publishers. Id. 
 43 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. For works created between 1964 and 1977, authors are encouraged to 
adhere to an amendment set forth in the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 4, § 9.05. The Amendment states that even when an application for renewal registration is un-
timely, the person or entity that possesses the right to renewal can still obtain renewal at any time 
within the renewed and extended term of sixty-seven years. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(3)(A)(ii); U.S. COPY-
RIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 15A: DURATION OF A COPYRIGHT 2 (2011), https://www.copyright.gov/
circs/circ15a.pdf [https://perma.cc/89FL-K9DE]. Despite these relaxed provisions, in an attempt to 
encourage prompt filings, Congress issued a ruling that authors who fail to register on a timely basis 
are at risk of forfeiting certain legal benefits. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 9.05. The purpose 
of this revised renewal registration process is to ensure that any rights conveyed in the original copy-
right registration are the same as those conveyed upon renewal. Id. 
 44 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. Sampling is a device used to enhance a musical composition by incor-
porating a segment of another sound recording into the composition. Taylor Maddox, The Art of Sam-
pling, BULLET MUSIC (Dec. 27, 2017), http://www.bulletmusic.net/features-1/2017/12/14/the-art-of-
sampling [https://perma.cc/3Z5Y-DZ7A]. Sampling has become a fixture of the music industry, with 
respect to production, as artists look to sample portions of older records in the hopes of re-invigorating 
them and offering their own creative interpretation on earlier musical works. Id. Artists must seek 
permission from copyright owners of either the sound recording or the song prior to sampling their 
works. GEOFFREY P. HULL ET AL., THE MUSIC BUSINESS AND RECORDING INDUSTRY: DELIVERING 
MUSIC IN THE 21ST CENTURY 105–06 (Routledge eds., 3d ed. 2011). Although permission is usually 
granted, it is typically purchased through a sampling license from the owner, which can range any-
where from $1,000 to over $25,000, or a percentage stake in the new recording copyrights. Id. at 106. 
The range varies considerably based on the importance of the sample being used and the extent to 
which it is newly exploited. Id. Yet, in spite of these procedural measures, copyright-related disputes 
involving the infringement of earlier musical works by more contemporary pieces have inundated 
courts in recent years. Edward Lee, Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1873, 1930 
(2018) (attributing this rise in copyright infringement lawsuits to the eradication of laches as a defense 
to copyright actions). The laches doctrine, a now abolished legal protection, enabled defendants to 
assert that a litigant’s claim was barred on the grounds that there was unreasonable delay in making 
the claim. The Laches Doctrine in Copyright Law, THRIVE THEMES, https://inventorbeware.com/
2016/01/the-laches-doctrine-in-copyright-law/ [https://perma.cc/LVJ5-XYSL]. In Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the laches defense was not applicable to copyright 
disputes because the congressionally enacted three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringe-
ment claims provided litigants with adequate protection. 572 U.S. 663, 681–82, 685 (2014). 
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“Suit & Tie.”45 Later that year, platinum-selling recording artist J. Cole also 
sampled the “Sho’ Nuff” master recording46 in the release of his popular track 
“Chaining Day.”47 
On January 6, 2016, the Band brought suit in the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York against every entity that had profited from 
exploiting the “Sho’ Nuff” recording and composition, including Dynatone, 
UMG, Unichappell, Perrell d/b/a Perrell Music, BMI, and Anheuser-Busch 
International, Inc.48 The Band sought declaratory judgments that it possessed 
the renewal term copyright for the “Sho’ Nuff” composition and that registra-
tion of the composition by defendant Unichappell’s predecessor was unen-
forceable.49 The Band also sought compensatory damages for injuries suffered 
as a result of defendants’ commercial use of the composition.50 Finally, with 
respect to the sound recording, the Band sought damages and a declaratory 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. “Suit & Tie” is an R&B song featured on Justin Timberlake’s third 
studio album, The 20/20 Experience. Justin Timberlake Unveils Suit and Tie Single, BBC NEWS (Jan. 
14, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-21008776 [https://perma.cc/73UZ-3SSJ]. 
The release of this single culminated the singer’s long-awaited return after a six-year hiatus from the 
music industry. Id. The single sold more than 3,000,000 copies domestically, attained platinum status in 
several other countries, and accumulated over 92,000,000 YouTube views. Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116; see 
Heather McDonald, Platinum Album Certification Explained, BALANCE (June 10, 2019), https://www.
thebalancecareers.com/platinum-album-certification-explained-2460607 [https://perma.cc/9C44-3TUM] 
(explaining that a single achieves platinum status once it has sold two million copies). 
 46 Master recordings, or masters, are the original sound recordings of musical works. What You 
Need to Know About a Master Recording, SONGTRADR (Sept. 6, 2016), https://blog.songtradr.com/
what-you-need-to-know-about-a-master-recording/ [https://perma.cc/4ANS-S86C]. 
 47 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116. “Chaining Day” is a hip-hop single featured on J. Cole’s second stu-
dio album, Born Sinner. Aaron Starkey, The Lyricism Behind J. Cole’s “Chaining Day,” LYRIC (Dec. 
22, 2013), https://theartofthelyric.wordpress.com/2013/12/22/the-lyricism-behind-j-coles-chaining-
day-by-aaron-starkey/ [https://perma.cc/PMD6-4RFA]. This song explores the rapper’s experiences 
with the rap music industry, specifically discussing his exposure to a new-age form of slavery wherein 
he expresses his desire to resist becoming a slave to the temptations of fame and materialism. Id. 
 48 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 116–17. Anheuser Busch International, Inc. was established in 1981 as a 
subsidiary responsible for the company’s international business operations and equity investments. 
Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc.—Company Profile, Information, Business Description, History, 
Background Information on Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., REFERENCE FOR BUS., https://www.
referenceforbusiness.com/history2/63/Anheuser-Busch-Companies-Inc.html [https://perma.cc/KN47-
6CA4]. In this action, Anheuser Busch International, Inc. was named as a defendant after Timber-
lake’s “Suit & Tie” was featured in an Anheuser-Busch commercial. Kat Greene, 2nd Circ. Revives 
Copyright Suit Over Timberlake Sample, LAW360 (June 6, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1050944/2nd-circ-revives-copyright-suit-over-timberlake-sample [https://perma.cc/9WET-7ZN2]. 
Additionally, the construction “d/b/a” means “doing business as.” D/B/A, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra note 6. 
 49 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 117. Declaratory judgments are binding decisions that establish the rights 
of litigating parties without issuing or directing enforcement. Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 6. 
 50 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 117. In calculating these compensatory damages, the Band suggested that 
the court award them an amount equal to the song’s earnings during the period of exploitation, which 
ranged from January 6, 2013 to January 6, 2016. Id. 
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judgment establishing that the Band, along with Perrell and UMG, were co-
owners of the renewal term copyright.51 
Defendants Dynatone, UMG, and Unichappell moved to dismiss the 
Band’s allegations for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6).52 The district court granted defendants’ motion and found that 
the Band’s claims were time-barred because defendants’ copyright registration 
previously repudiated the Band’s claims of ownership that arose during the 
original copyright terms.53 Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit on the 
grounds that their ownership claims to the renewal term copyrights for the “Sho’ 
Nuff” composition and sound recording had not been repudiated by defendants’ 
registrations, arguing that registration alone was insufficient to accrue an owner-
ship claim.54 In reviewing the inquiry of whether copyright registration places 
others on adequate notice of adverse ownership claims, the Second Circuit 
joined the fray of circuit courts that have grappled with this question.55 
II. CHRONOLOGY AND DISCUSSION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 2018 decision in Wil-
son v. Dynatone Publishing Co. establishes a clear rift with the First Circuit as 
to whether registration alone is sufficient to accrue an ownership claim and 
place a diligent author on constructive notice of an adverse claim to author-
ship.56 Prior to Wilson, the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits already held that 
permitting registration to constitute adequate notice of a copyright ownership 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (providing that upon termination of a copyright’s original term, the 
copyright shall subsist for a renewed and extended term of sixty-seven years). The Band again argued 
for compensatory damages to be calculated in a manner identical to those of the commercial exploita-
tion for the “Sho’ Nuff” composition. Wilson, 892 F.3d at 117. 
 52 Wilson, 892 F.3d at 117. The Band settled out of court with Perrell, BMI, and Anheuser-Busch 
International, Inc. for an undisclosed amount. Id. 
 53 Id. at 115. Following the district court’s decision, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s 
grant of defendants’ motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and remanded for further 
proceedings. Id. at 120. Defendants then petitioned for reconsideration, disputing the Second Circuit’s 
ruling and arguing that the Band’s suit was untimely, thereby bringing this matter before the Second 
Circuit again. Wilson, 908 F.3d at 844.  
 54 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9, Wilson, 908 F.3d 843 (No. 17-01549). 
 55 See, e.g., Brownstein, 742 F.3d at 71–72 (holding that mere registration alone is insufficient to 
revoke a competing claim of exclusive ownership); Roger Miller Music, 477 F.3d at 390 (determining 
that registration does not trigger accrual of an ownership claim); Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 655 (holding 
that § 205(c) serves to establish priority among competing transfers of title, as opposed to placing 
authors on notice of adverse claims). 
 56 Compare Wilson v. Dynatone Publ’g Co., 908 F.3d 843, 844–45 (2d Cir. 2018) (declining to 
follow the First Circuit’s ruling, and holding that registration alone cannot create a legitimate owner-
ship claim and begin the running of the statute of limitations), with Saenger Org., Inc. v. Nationwide 
Ins. Licensing Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 55, 66 (1st Cir. 1997) (interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (2018) to 
state that registration alone is sufficient to put others on notice, and thus establish an ownership claim 
time-barring the assertion of competing claims after three years’ time).  
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claim would impose an overly cumbersome obligation upon a reasonably at-
tentive author.57 
Section A of this Part details the cases leading up to Wilson that established 
the split among the circuits.58 Section B analyzes the Wilson holding itself.59 
A. Pre-Wilson Chronology: Setting the Stage for the Circuit Split 
The existing circuit split among the First, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Cir-
cuits centers on the issue of whether the act of registration is enough to com-
mence accrual of an ownership claim, thereby tolling the statute of limitations 
for those potentially seeking to allege adverse ownership claims.60 In the First 
Circuit’s 1997 decision in Saenger Organization v. Nationwide Insurance Li-
censing Associates, Inc., the Saenger Organization, Inc. (Saenger) filed a copy-
right infringement claim seeking to enjoin Lawrence R. Durkin, Nationwide 
Insurance Licensing Associates, Inc., and Commonwealth Licensing Group 
(collectively, Defendants) from the publication and distribution of insurance 
materials produced by Defendants.61 Durkin alleged that he had entered into a 
verbal partnership agreement with Saenger to produce insurance licensing sup-
plements for the corporation in return for co-authorship rights over the copy-
rights in these materials.62 At the time of registration, however, Saenger drafted 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 71–72 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that registration alone 
is not enough to repudiate an adverse claim for sole ownership because authors are not obligated to 
constantly monitor the Copyright Office record for competing claims); Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. 
Sony/ATV Publ’g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 390 (6th Cir. 2007) (ruling that claims for ownership do not 
accrue upon registration and, instead, amass when an author plainly and expressly repudiates an ad-
verse claim for sole authorship); Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing that the copyright registration system was intended to serve functions other than notice, such as 
the promotion of creativity, and therefore does not start the running of the statute of limitations). 
 58 See infra notes 60–77 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
 60 See Brownstein, 742 F.3d at 71–72 (ruling that the act of registration is not sufficient to place 
an attentive author on notice of an adverse claim of authorship); Roger Miller Music, 477 F.3d at 390 
(holding that registration does not disavow a competing ownership claim because such action does not 
constitute an express repudiation to trigger accrual of an ownership claim); Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 654–
55 (ruling that the legislative function of notice and registration for copyright law is not to commence 
the tolling of the statute of limitations); Saenger, 119 F.3d at 66–67 (determining that copyright own-
ership claims accrue upon registration of the copyright because such action is sufficient to place others 
on notice of any adverse claims of authorship). 
 61 119 F.3d at 56, 58–59. Durkin acted as an officer and vice president of the Saenger Organiza-
tion, a corporation in the business of producing insurance licensing materials. Id. at 57. 
 62 Id. at 55, 57. It is undisputed that the parties did not enter into a signed, written agreement 
providing that the work developed by Durkin for Saenger would be regarded as work made for hire. 
Id. at 60. Accordingly, the First Circuit engaged in a thorough analysis to determine whether Durkin 
had created the insurance materials within the scope of his employment. See id. at 60–63 (holding that 
the materials fell within the statutory meaning of “works made for hire” because Durkin was em-
ployed by Saenger and had developed the insurance materials within the scope of his employment); 
see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining the statutory standard for “works made for hire”). 
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a copyright application identifying the Saenger Organization as the sole owner 
of the copyright.63 Although Durkin denied seeing the application, he admitted 
to being present when Saenger prepared the copyright application that omitted 
his co-authorship.64 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ultimately ruled 
in favor of Saenger, finding that Durkin’s subsequent productions infringed 
upon Saenger’s copyright, and the First Circuit later affirmed this decision.65 
In relevant part, the First Circuit held that Durkin’s claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations because Saenger had sufficiently placed Durkin on notice 
of Saenger’s claim of authorship.66 Although the First Circuit explicitly held 
that Saenger’s copyright registration had placed Durkin on constructive notice 
of Saenger’s exclusive ownership claim, the court also observed that Durkin 
had actual notice because he knew or should have known that the application, 
which was prepared in his presence, had omitted his name.67 Given the pres-
ence of both actual and constructive notice in the unique facts of this case, it is 
unclear to what extent the First Circuit relied upon its position that registration 
is sufficient to repudiate another’s claim of ownership.68 
Following the decision in Saenger, several other circuits undertook re-
view of § 205(c) and the function of copyright registration, subsequently 
bringing the First Circuit’s holding under heavy scrutiny.69 In 2004, the Third 
Circuit in Gaiman v. McFarlane outright questioned the decision in Saenger 
and held that the First Circuit’s interpretation of § 205(c) was misguided.70 The 
Gaiman court reasoned that the statute’s express purpose is to ascertain priori-
                                                                                                                           
 63 Saenger, 119 F.3d at 65. Durkin asserted that Saenger breached its verbal agreement by listing 
itself as the exclusive owner in its copyright registration with the Copyright Office. Id. Despite dis-
covering that he had not been named as a co-author for the copyright, Durkin proceeded to ignore the 
registration and continue publishing texts for his employer. Id. at 58. 
 64 Id. at 65. 
 65 Id. at 64; see Saenger Org., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., Inc., 864 F. Supp. 246, 
248–49 (D. Mass. 1994) (granting injunctive relief to Saenger upon finding sufficient evidence that 
Durkin plagiarized the copyrighted works of Saenger, which he previously created for Saenger while 
in its employment). Injunctive relief is a type of remedy, wherein courts require a party to do or cease 
from doing a certain act. Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6. 
 66 Saenger, 119 F.3d at 66; see Catrone v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass’n N. Am., 929 F.2d 881, 
885 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that Massachusetts’ discovery rule requires that the running of the statute 
of limitations be stalled while the facts of a claim “remain inherently unknowable” to the injured indi-
vidual). 
 67 Saenger, 119 F.3d at 66. 
 68 See id. (holding that Durkin’s claims were time-barred because Durkin had constructive as well 
as actual notice of Saenger’s adverse claim of sole copyright ownership). By equating the Copyright 
Act’s protections to those afforded by federal patent law, the First Circuit reasoned that Saenger’s regis-
tration effectively had placed the public on notice of its sole ownership over the copyright and facts stat-
ed in its copyright certificate. Id. 
 69 See infra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 70 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 655. 
II.-64 Boston College Law Review [61:E. Supp. 
ty when disputes arise among competing claims of ownership.71 The Third 
Circuit went on to determine that the claimant’s assertion of co-ownership was 
timely.72 In so doing, the Gaiman court concluded that the statute of limitations 
began tolling after the defendant denied that the claimant had copyrights over 
the work, and not at the time of defendant’s publication.73 
Similarly, in 2007, the Sixth Circuit in Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. 
Sony/ATV Publishing, LLC held that the plaintiffs’ ownership claims were not 
time-barred.74 The Sixth Circuit determined that although the defendant had 
filed an application for the renewal copyrights, such action did not meet the 
demand of a clear and express repudiation of plaintiffs’ ownership.75 Finally, in 
2014 in Brownstein v. Lindsay, the Seventh Circuit followed the Third Cir-
cuit’s ruling in Gaiman, and held that mere copyright registration did not 
amount to repudiation of co-authorship because co-authors are not required to 
constantly monitor the registry for adverse ownership claims.76 The emerging 
majority among the circuit courts cast further doubt upon the First Circuit’s 
decision and, in so doing, provided the Second Circuit with ample support to 
reach its ultimate determination in Wilson.77 
B. The Wilson Ruling 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Wilson further highlighted the split 
among the circuits by joining the approach of the Third, Sixth, and Seventh 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 656. 
 73 Id. The Third Circuit ruled that a proper reading of § 205(c) instructs that recordation of a docu-
ment with the Copyright Office merely puts others on constructive notice of the facts stated in the docu-
ment identifying a registered work, and therefore does not impute upon co-authors an obligation to con-
sult the register for adverse ownership claims. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c); Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 655. 
 74 Roger Miller Music, 477 F.3d at 390. 
 75 Id. The Sixth Circuit reached its decision by comparing the facts of the case to those of Ritchie 
v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 288 (6th Cir. 2005). Roger Miller Music, 477 F.3d at 390. In Roger Miller 
Music, the Sixth Circuit determined that although an audit letter was sent by plaintiff to defendant, it 
did not contain any clear assertions of ownership over the renewal copyrights, and consequently did 
not evidence a plain and explicit repudiation of ownership. 477 F.3d at 390. In Ritchie, however, be-
cause the letter sent by Kid Rock to defendants included his claims of sole ownership over songs he 
had written, the Sixth Circuit held that the letter amounted to a clear and explicit repudiation of de-
fendants’ ownership claim and commenced the running of the statute of limitations. 395 F.3d at 288. 
 76 See Brownstein, 742 F.3d at 71. The Seventh Circuit noted the serious dangers in holding that 
registration alone is sufficient to place others on notice of an ownership claim. Id. at 72. The court 
reasoned that an opposing decision would fail to protect legitimate copyright owners and encourage 
individuals, challenging the authorship of others, to furtively register copyrights to start the statute of 
limitations tolling and then, if the author learned of the registration after three years’ time, the author’s 
claim of ownership would be void. Id. 
 77 See Wilson, 908 F.3d at 844 (noting that several other circuit courts have deliberated on wheth-
er registration triggers accrual of a copyright ownership claim, with the majority reaching determina-
tions that are inapposite to the First Circuit’s holding in Saenger). 
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Circuits.78 The Second Circuit adopted the holding that registration alone does 
not give rise to a copyright ownership claim.79 Consistent with the circuit ma-
jority, the Second Circuit explicitly declined to follow the approach of the First 
Circuit in Saenger.80 
The court determined that the First Circuit erroneously interpreted 
§ 205(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976.81 The Second Circuit reasoned that the 
First Circuit misinterpreted § 205(c) as a definitive rule, rather than reading the 
provision in light of its intended purpose—to establish priority among compet-
ing ownership claims and resolve potential disputes in the context of transfers 
of title.82 The Second Circuit also focused its analysis on the plain meaning of 
§ 205(c), holding that the statute’s language provided no support for the First 
Circuit’s determination that an ownership claim accrues upon registration 
alone.83 The Second Circuit, moreover, ruled that the First Circuit’s reliance on 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See 908 F.3d at 844 (joining the majority of circuits in holding that registration is not sufficient 
to place a reasonably attentive author on notice of an adverse claim of ownership); Brownstein, 742 
F.3d at 71–72 (holding that ownership claims do not accrue upon mere registration); Roger Miller 
Music, 477 F.3d at 390 (holding that registration alone is not enough to repudiate an adverse claim of 
exclusive ownership); Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 654–55 (holding that registration was intended by the 
legislature to serve a notice function for authors). 
 79 Wilson, 908 F.3d at 844. 
 80 See id. (noting that the First Circuit’s decision in Saenger to hold defendant’s ownership claim 
as time-barred considered the fact that Defendant had both actual and constructive notice of plaintiff’s 
exclusive authorship claim, and was not exclusively reliant upon the fact that defendant had construc-
tive notice as a result of Plaintiff’s registration).  
 81 Id. at 845. 
 82 Id. According to § 205(d), in the event that two conflicting transfers of title occur, the one first 
executed will succeed, under the condition that it is adequately recorded to provide constructive notice 
under subsection (c). 17 U.S.C. § 205(d); see Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 655 (determining that the intended 
function of § 205(c) is to serve as a means for establishing priority in case potential disputes arise over 
the rights of creditors); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Hirsch, 104 F.3d 1163, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(reasoning that § 205(c) should be utilized as a method for determining priority for security interests 
in the event of ownership transfers). Transfers of title allow copyright holders to convey their owner-
ship rights in copyrighted works to third parties. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 19, at 3. Fur-
thermore, the Gaiman court criticized the First Circuit’s finding that under § 205(c), registration alone 
establishes constructive notice, thereby clarifying that recordation with the Copyright Office only 
provides constructive notice of the specific facts contained within the recorded document. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 205(c); Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 655. 
 83 Wilson, 908 F.3d at 845 (holding that the language of § 205(c) does not expressly state that 
ownership claims are untimely if they are filed more than three years after a competing registration). 
In determining when accrual of an infringement claim arises, federal courts have adopted two oppos-
ing interpretations. Stefan Mentzer & Carmen Lo, Second Circuit Adopts Plaintiff-Friendly “Discov-
ery Rule” for Copyright Infringement Claims, WHITE & CASE (May 20, 2014), https://www.whitecase.
com/publications/article/second-circuit-adopts-plaintiff-friendly-discovery-rule-copyright-infringement 
[https://perma.cc/MCH8-QMEK]. The majority of courts apply the “discovery rule,” which states that 
a copyright infringement claim accrues when the copyright holder learns of the infringement, or 
should have learned of the infringement through due diligence. Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
748 F.3d 120, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2014). A minority of courts employ the “injury rule,” which instructs 
that an infringement claim accrues once the infringement began. Mentzer & Lo, supra. This practice 
consequently obligates the copyright holder to file an infringement claim no later than three years 
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actual notice raised uncertainty as to whether the First Circuit would have 
reached the same conclusion had the defendant possessed only constructive 
notice.84 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit concluded that even if the First Cir-
cuit’s holding was firmly grounded in the position that registration alone quali-
fies as adequate constructive notice, such a holding misinterpreted the purpose 
of § 205 and was at odds with the statute’s broader legislative intent of deter-
mining priority for transfers of title and security interests.85 
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PRACTICAL HOLDING 
As innovation and intellectual property-based industries expand, so too 
does the need for concrete protections that secure authors’ ownership rights in 
their creative works.86 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 
2018 decision in Wilson v. Dynatone Publishing Co. seeks to protect authors 
from unknowingly forfeiting their ownership rights to others filing illegitimate 
registrations.87 The Second Circuit’s ruling in Wilson rejects the argument that 
an ownership claim accrues upon registration of a copyright, triggering the 
tolling of the statute of limitations.88 Section A of this Part details the manner 
in which the Wilson court’s interpretation of the constructive notice provision 
of § 205(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 adheres to legislative intent.89 Section 
B explains why the First Circuit’s opposing holding in Saenger Organization v. 
Nationwide Insurance Licensing Associates, Inc. should be cabined to its 
unique facts and not viewed as representative of a true circuit split with respect 
to the proper interpretation of § 205(c).90 Section C discusses why the interpre-
tation of § 205(c), as promoted by the Wilson decision, will prevent the dis-
couragement of registered copyrights, and will protect authors from losing 
their ownership rights to illegitimate claims.91 
                                                                                                                           
after the infringement commenced, irrespective of when the owner discovered the infringement. Id. In 
2014, the Second Circuit ruled in Psihoyos that the “discovery rule” was the appropriate method for 
tolling the statute of limitations in copyright infringement claims. 748 F.3d at 124–25. In so holding, 
the Second Circuit joined with three of the four other circuits that had considered this question. See 
Mentzer & Lo, supra (noting that eight other circuits, in addition to the Second Circuit, have since 
implemented the discovery rule). 
 84 Wilson, 908 F.3d at 844–45. 
 85 Id. at 845 & n.1. 
 86 See Copyright/Authors’ Right: Frequently Asked Questions, COPYRIGHTLINK, https://www.
copyrightlink.org/why-copyrights-matter.html [https://perma.cc/9D8Y-PWEE] (stating that the pur-
pose of copyrights is to secure the property rights of authors in their creative works, a concept that is 
more crucial now in the digital age than ever before). 
 87 908 F.3d 843, 845 (2d Cir. 2018) (reasoning that by allowing copyright ownership claims to 
accrue upon registration, authors would be responsible for constantly checking the records of the 
Copyright Office to ensure that there were no adverse claims of ownership against their works). 
 88 Id. 
 89 See infra notes 92–99 and accompanying text. 
 90 119 F.3d 55, 66 (1st Cir. 1997); see infra notes 100–105 and accompanying text. 
 91 See infra notes 106–113 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Second Circuit’s Interpretation Promotes Legislative Intent 
Use of the “plain meaning rule” in statutory construction is widely ac-
cepted as controlling among both state and federal courts.92 The technique en-
tails interpreting a statute in accordance with the ordinary, probable meaning of 
the language therein, unless such interpretation would result in a perverse out-
come or one that cuts against legislative intent.93 Section 205(c) provides that 
constructive notice attaches only when a registered document precisely identi-
fies the work of authorship and its contents, such that others could discover the 
document through a reasonable title search.94 Accordingly, this language re-
veals the congressional intent to mandate that, prior to the attachment of con-
structive notice, the public knows or should have known of the copyright 
through a reasonable title search of the Copyright Registry.95 As a result of the 
legislature’s emphasis on the significance of knowledge in the context of copy-
right registration, many courts have found the “discovery rule” to be a rational 
method for determining when a claim of copyright ownership has accrued.96 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Con-
tractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (noting that in cases where the statute’s plain meaning is 
found to be unreasonable, the intent of the drafters will control); Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 713 
(Fla. 2007) (holding that application of the plain meaning rule is proper for interpreting statutes in 
state court); see also Steven Wisotsky, How to Interpret Statutes—Or Not: Plain Meaning and Other 
Phantoms, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321, 325 (2009) (arguing that the plain meaning rule is just 
one of many methods used by advocates when interpreting a statute in a way that is both most useful 
to a client’s position and most aligned with the statute’s intention). 
 93 Peter Jeremy Smith, Commas, Constitutional Grammar, and the Straight-Face Test: What if 
Conan the Grammarian Were a Strict Textualist?, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 7, 21, 22 n.38 (1999). 
 94 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (2018). The U.S. Copyright Office provides a database of copyright records 
that allows individuals to search through registered copyrights for information concerning ownership, 
transfers of title, derivative works, and publication. Richard Stim, Searching the Copyright Office and 
Library of Congress Records, STAN. U. LIBRS., https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/copyright-
research/searching-records/ [https://perma.cc/JY9Z-4VLL]. Typically, users only need to have basic 
information, such as an author, title, or publisher, to conduct a sweeping search of the Copyright Of-
fice’s records. Id. 
 95 See ROBERT BRAUNEIS, ABRAHAM L. KAMINSTEIN SCHOLAR IN RESIDENCE, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, TRANSFORMING DOCUMENT RECORDATION AT THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE 7, 
24, 51, 102, 106 (2014) (describing the legislative intent that codifies the importance of having 
knowledge of the work). 
 96 See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Construction and Application of 17 U.S.C.A. § 507(b), 
Requiring That Civil Copyright Action Be Commenced Within 3 Years After Claim Accrued, 140 
A.L.R. Fed. 641, at *1–2 (2019) (examining federal court decisions that have applied § 507(b), which 
sets forth a limitations period of three years for civil copyright claims, and noting numerous instances 
in which courts followed the discovery rule). In contrast to the injury rule, the discovery rule high-
lights the importance of knowledge in the context of copyright registration and, in doing so, best ex-
emplifies the drafter’s intent to use registration as a method for establishing priority among competing 
claims of ownership, instead of a notice function that commences the running of the statute of limita-
tions. See Chi. Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian House, Inc., 770 F.3d 610, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(noting that the discovery rule is a judicial gloss). The concept of judicial gloss, in which a judge 
provides an official interpretation of a statute or other form of legislation, thus plays a significant role 
in establishing the legitimacy of the discovery rule. Gloss, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6. 
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The discovery rule instructs that copyright ownership claims can accrue only 
when the aggrieved party becomes aware or should have been aware of the 
injury that establishes the grounds for the claim.97 The First Circuit’s holding 
in Saenger, that registration alone was sufficient to trigger accrual, therefore 
runs afoul of congressional intent which requires sole reliance upon plaintiff’s 
knowledge of the copyright injury.98 Conversely, the Second Circuit’s ruling in 
Wilson does align with the legislative intent of § 205(c)’s constructive notice 
provision by endorsing the discovery rule and rejecting the rationale that the 
statute of limitations starts to toll upon registration.99 
B. The Ruling of Saenger Should Be Cabined to Its Facts 
At first glance, the First Circuit’s holding in Saenger appears to stand in 
contrast to the decisions of its sister circuits, and subsequently Wilson, by assert-
ing that copyright registration alone is sufficient to commence accrual of a regis-
trant’s ownership claim.100 This presumption, however, is misconceived because 
the Saenger ruling should be cabined to its facts.101 Although the First Circuit 
applied § 205(c) in a similar manner, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s reg-
istration for sole ownership of co-authored copyrights had effectively placed the 
                                                                                                                           
Moreover, the discovery rule is particularly relevant in circumstances similar to Wilson, wherein a 
copyright owner lacks knowledge of the third-party infringement and is then prevented from recover-
ing despite having a viable claim due to time constraints. Lisa M. Bieniek, Federal Statute of Limita-
tions on Copyright Infringement, CHRON, https://smallbusiness.chron.com/federal-statute-limitations-
copyright-infringement-64917.html [https://perma.cc/T5AE-GV65]. 
 97 Theuman, supra note 96, at *3a, *6b. 
 98 See Saenger Org., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 55, 66 (1st Cir. 
1997) (reasoning that § 205(c) is properly interpreted as providing that registration of a copyright 
places the entirety of society on constructive notice of exclusive ownership, irrespective of the puta-
tive claimant’s individual knowledge of the copyright, and subsequently triggers the running of the 
statute of limitations for all adverse claims). 
 99 See Wilson, 908 F.3d at 845 (holding that plaintiffs’ copyright claims were not time-barred 
because defendants’ registration of the copyrights in the musical composition and sound recording had 
not triggered the accrual of Plaintiffs’ claims for exclusive ownership and started the tolling of the 
statute of limitations). 
 100 Compare Saenger, 119 F.3d at 66 (holding that defendant’s ownership claim was time-barred 
because his co-author previously registered as the sole owner of the work more than three years prior), 
with Wilson, 908 F.3d at 845 (determining that plaintiffs’ suit was not untimely, despite occurring 
more than three years after defendants filed for ownership of the renewal term copyrights, because 
plaintiffs’ adverse ownership claims had not accrued automatically upon defendants’ registration with 
the Copyright Office); see also Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 71–72 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding 
that if registration alone was enough to place authors on notice of adverse claims for ownership, then 
claimants would be incentivized to register spurious copyrights and potentially claim ownership over 
the works of others if such authors did not discover the registrations in time); Gaiman v. McFarlane, 
360 F.3d 644, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the legislative purpose of registration in the context 
of copyright law is not to serve as an automatic trigger for the running of the statute of limitations). 
 101 See infra notes 102–105 and accompanying text. 
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defendant on constructive notice of the plaintiff’s claim.102 In reaching this deci-
sion, however, the Saenger court relied upon the fact that the defendant had ac-
tual notice of plaintiff’s exclusive ownership claim due to his physical presence 
when plaintiff was preparing the copyright application, in addition to receiving 
constructive notice through plaintiff’s registration of the copyrights.103 Given the 
presence of both actual and constructive notice, it is not clear that the First Cir-
cuit would have reached a similar determination had the defendant possessed 
only constructive notice of plaintiff’s copyright registration.104 As a result, the 
import of the Saenger ruling should be limited to its unique facts and should not 
be perceived as evidence of a genuine split among the circuits with respect to the 
interpretation of § 205(c) and the legal effects of registering a copyright.105 
C. The Second Circuit’s Interpretation of § 205(c) in Wilson Will Likely 
Encourage Copyright Registration and Protect Authors from Theft 
The Second Circuit’s ruling in Wilson evidences a promising step by pre-
serving authors’ ownership rights and may, in turn, prompt increased participa-
tion in U.S. copyright registration.106 The Wilson decision delineates an inter-
pretation of § 205(c) that aligns with the overarching goals of the Copyright 
Act of 1976 and its registration system, namely the encouragement of copy-
right registration and a softening of the 1909 Copyright Act’s rigid compliance 
with copyright formalities.107 Upon determining that registration alone does 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Saenger, 119 F.3d at 66 (holding that registration of copyright ownership places the general 
public, including the putative author, on constructive notice of the registrant’s adverse claim of sole 
authorship). 
 103 See id. at 65–66 (noting that defendant had actual notice of plaintiff’s claim for sole authorship 
of the copyrights because defendant had witnessed plaintiff prepare the registration and had also used 
materials that visibly credited plaintiff with exclusive ownership). Although it is unclear the extent to 
which the presence of actual notice, as compared to constructive notice, played a role in the First Cir-
cuit’s decision, it is nevertheless noteworthy because the court considered both facts in reaching its 
decision. Id.; see Wilson, 908 F.3d at 846 (noting that the First Circuit considered facts that indicated 
that defendant had both actual and constructive notice of plaintiff’s claim for exclusive ownership). 
 104 Wilson, 908 F.3d at 845; see Horror Inc. v. Miller, 335 F. Supp. 3d 273, 321 n.24 (D. Conn. 
2018) (noting that the First Circuit, in Saenger, is the only circuit to hold that registration of copyright 
ownership amounts to sufficient constructive notice to a putative author, and further qualifying the 
First Circuit’s ruling by highlighting the fact that the author in Saenger received both actual and con-
structive notice of the copyright registration). 
 105 See Wilson, 908 F.3d at 845 (reasoning that the decision in Saenger was likely induced by the 
presence of actual notice, thereby raising uncertainty as to whether the First Circuit would have come 
to the same conclusion had there been no actual notice present); see also Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 655 
(noting the presence of both actual and constructive notice in Saenger). 
 106 See infra notes 107–113 and accompanying text. 
 107 See Erin Hogan, Approval Versus Application: How to Interpret the Registration Requirement 
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 843, 846 (2006) (discussing how the revisions 
of the Copyright Act of 1976 restructured copyright law by eradicating copyright formalities and 
replacing them with incentive-based initiatives). The Copyright Act of 1976 dismantled several statu-
tory formalities that functioned as preconditions to establishing copyrights and recognizing authors’ 
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not trigger accrual of an ownership claim, thereby tolling the statute of limita-
tions, the Wilson ruling avoids burdening authors with the duty of constantly 
investigating the Copyright Registry for adverse claims of ownership.108 A 
holding to the contrary would likely further dissuade authors from utilizing the 
voluntary registration system altogether, and ultimately could lead them to un-
intentionally forfeit their legal rights.109 Additionally, judicial opinions that 
equate mere registration with notice may make it easier for copyright thieves 
to fraudulently acquire the works of authors who might inadvertently forfeit 
ownership by failing to check the Copyright Registry on a regular basis.110 Fi-
                                                                                                                           
rights. Compare Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (lacking rigid formalities), with Act 
of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (repealed by the Copyright Act of 1976) (containing copyright 
formalities, such as the requirement of a deposit of copies of a work upon publication and the mandate 
that failure or exclusion of notice might forfeit the copyright). Additionally, the 1976 Act created a 
completely voluntary, centralized system for federal copyright registration. Hogan, supra, at 846. 
Among the copyright formalities eliminated by these revisions was the removal of the requirement 
that authors register their works with the U.S. Copyright Office. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing 
Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 488 (2004). Thus, to maintain the prominence and strength of the 
public record, Congress created numerous registration incentives, such as requiring registration prior 
to filing suit for copyright infringement in a federal court, which were aimed at encouraging authors to 
register their works. John B. Koegel, Bamboozlement: The Repeal of Copyright Registration Incen-
tives, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 529, 533–34 (1995). 
 108 See Wilson, 908 F.3d at 845 (rejecting the argument that registration is enough for an owner-
ship claim to accrue and thus subjects authors to legitimate adverse claims for sole authorship). 
 109 See id. (reasoning that an inapposite interpretation of § 205(c) would burden authors by requir-
ing them to continuously monitor the Copyright Registry—an impossible and impractical obligation—
as well as expose them to having their rights stolen by others filing surreptitious registrations). The 
1976 Copyright Act’s abandonment of copyright formalities stemmed from a historical understanding 
that strict adherence to registration was an insurmountable hardship for authors. Dev S. Gangjee, Cop-
yright Formalities: A Return to Registration?, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 213, 
228 (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017); see Joshua O. Mausner, Copyright Orphan 
Works: A Multi-Pronged Solution to Solve a Harmful Market Inefficiency, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 517, 536–37 (2008) (noting that mandatory registration has drawbacks, namely disincentiviz-
ing authors to license their intellectual property). Today, the Library of Congress maintains a public 
record of registered copyrights, which helps to arm authors with proof of the existence of their works 
and dates of creation, while also publicizing information to dissuade potential infringers. Koegel, 
supra note 107, at 534, 539. In spite of these benefits, the U.S. Copyright Office is fraught with ongo-
ing problems, including understaffing and outdated technology, and the registry itself is substantially 
expansive and oftentimes ridden with incomplete information. Maria A. Pallante, Meyer Lecture: The 
Next Generation Copyright Office: What It Means and Why It Matters, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 213, 218–19, 223 (2014). Coupled with the 1976 Act’s introduction of voluntary registration, 
these additional hindrances make it careless for courts to interpret § 205(c) in a manner that requires 
constant monitoring of the Copyright Registry. See Wilson, 908 F.3d at 845 (refusing to impose upon 
authors the obligation to constantly investigate the Copyright Registry). 
 110 See Wilson, 908 F.3d at 845 (reasoning that if mere registration were to trigger accrual of 
copyright ownership claims, authors would be more vulnerable to theft because potentially false 
claims would be automatically validated if legitimate authors failed to discover them). Copyright 
owners are advised to be vigilant in monitoring infringement to avoid unintentionally forfeiting their 
ownership rights or missing an opportunity to bring forth legal action. Mallory King, Copyright Stat-
ute of Limitations: Don’t Sleep on Your Rights, TRAVERSE LEGAL (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.
traverselegal.com/blog/copyright-statute-of-limitations-dont-sleep-on-your-rights/ [https://perma.cc/
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nally, the Wilson holding aligns with the central principles of the Copyright Act 
of 1976, emphasizing that noncompliance with copyright formalities such as 
failing to check the Copyright Registry, should come only at the cost of recov-
ering statutory damages, never at the loss of an author’s rights.111 The Wilson 
ruling, in accordance with the majority of the Second Circuit’s sister circuits, 
furthers the fundamental goals of copyright law.112 By endorsing greater pro-
tections for authors and their works and encouraging use of the copyright reg-
istration system, Wilson allows for greater dissemination of artistic and crea-
tive works amongst the public.113 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Wilson 
v. Dynatone Publishing Co. that copyright registration alone does not provide 
sufficient notice of an adverse claim to the reasonably diligent author. The Wil-
son court correctly interpreted the constructive notice provision of § 205(c) of 
the Copyright Act, noting the omission of any statutory language related to 
accrual of ownership claims upon registration. Additionally, the Second Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
B36W-6E5H]. In an effort to prevent such theft, particularly in the context of works of co-authorship, 
courts have held that a policy of plain and express repudiation of ownership is an appropriate standard 
for determining the time at which ownership accrues, as opposed to registration. See Brownstein, 742 
F.3d at 71–72 (holding that registration alone is not sufficient to repudiate an adverse claim of exclu-
sive ownership); Roger Miller Music v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 390 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that ownership claims accrue upon plain and express repudiation of competing ownership 
claim). 
 111 See Wilson, 908 F.3d at 844 (holding that plaintiffs’ suit is not time-barred because § 205(c) 
does not instruct that registration alone commences accrual of a copyright ownership claim, for such 
an interpretation would unreasonably deny plaintiffs’ their right to bring suit); Mausner, supra note 
109, at 536–37 (criticizing former mandatory registration requirements that resulted in loss of copy-
right protection for mere failure to comply with formalities); see also SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDIES 17–19: 
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 79 (Comm. Print. 1960) (detailing studies submitted to the U.S. Copy-
right Office, including one copyright expert’s view that even authors who never register their works 
should not be at risk of losing their copyrights). In accordance with international changes in copyright 
law, the United States removed all statutory formalities that potentially could infringe upon authors’ 
copyright interests, thereby departing from previous doctrine that adhering to procedural formalities 
was a prerequisite to the rights and benefits possessed by the copyright owner. Hogan, supra note 107, 
at 847; see Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856, 
869–71 (1978) (discussing the transition from the 1909 Act’s dictate that noncompliance with formali-
ties deprived authors of their copyright protections, to the 1976 Act’s position that such noncompli-
ance was not incurable). 
 112 See Hogan, supra note 107, at 846 (describing the revisions and policies underlying the 1976 
Copyright Act as strategies for encouraging copyright registration, including the guarantee of legal 
rights and the establishment of less stringent procedural hurdles). 
 113 See Bart A. Starr, Fixing Copyright’s Three-Year Limitations Clock: The Accrual of an In-
fringement Claim Under 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 623, 627–28 (2000) (noting that copy-
right protections aim to nurture the creative endeavors of authors while striking a balance with the 
larger societal benefits derived from a public record of creative works of authorship). 
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rightly adhered to the statute’s legislative purpose of establishing priority 
among competing claims of sole authorship. Additionally, the First Circuit’s 
inapposite holding in Saenger Organization v. Nationwide Insurance Licensing 
Associates, Inc. should be confined to its unique factual circumstances because 
the putative author in Saenger had both actual and constructive notice that his 
co-author had registered a copyright claiming exclusive ownership. Lastly, 
burdening authors with the responsibility of constantly investigating the Copy-
right Office registry will discourage authors from utilizing the registration sys-
tem, and subsequently will lead them to unknowingly deny themselves of the 
critical legal protections that accompany registration. The Second Circuit’s 
holding in Wilson strengthens the ability of authors to protect themselves from 
baseless claims of adverse ownership and furthers the intentions of the Copy-
right Act of 1976 by validating that failure to comply with copyright formali-
ties may require authors to forfeit statutory damages, but will not require them 
to lose their rights. 
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